ArchiMate_SABSA

Modeling SABSA® in ArchiMate®

00. Preface

Mission of The Open Group: drive the creation of Boundaryless Information Flow

The Joint Working Group aims to develop a settled consensus of core security elements, relationships, and properties - referred to collectively as the “Security Overlay”.

01. Introduction

01.01 Background

SABSA Blue Book (Executive Summary)

01.02 The ArchiMate® Specification

(see:03. Introduction of ArchiMate)

Figure 1; A Simple ArchiMate Diagram

01.03 Purpose

02. Rationale for the Alignment of SABSA and ArchiMate

02.1 Benefits of Modeling

02.2 The Case of an ArchiMate Security Perspective

02.3 Benefits that Modeling Can Bring to SABSA

02.4 Benefits of Modeling to the Practitioner

02.5 Vendor Neutrality

03. Introduction of ArchiMate

03.1 Core Elements

03.2 Core Relationships

03.3 Extension Layers and Elements

03.4 ArchiMate Language Customization

03.4.1 User-Defined Attributes

03.4.2 Specializations and “Stereotypes”

Figure 2: In-Model versus Out-of-Model Specialization

03.4.3 Overloaded Relationships

03.5 The ArchiMate Full Framework

04. Aligning SABSA and ArchiMate Framework

04.1 Introduction to the Security Overlay

04.2 An Overview of the Task

04.3 Risk & Security Modeling in the ArchiMate Specification

Figure 6: The Risk-Modeling Example in the ArchiMate 3.2 Specification

Figure 7: Risk Modeling Relationships

Figure 8: Mapping of Risk and Security Elements

Figure 9: ArchiMate Motivation Metamodel

04.4 The Basic Element and Relationships

05. The Motivation Aspect

Figure 10: Security Enhanced Motivation Metamodel

05.1 Value & Loss

Figure 11: Modeling Assets using Value

05.2 Value Chain

Figure 12: Composition of Value Chains

05.3 SABSA Business Attributes

Figure 13: SABSA Business Attributes Represented in the ArchiMate Language

5.3.1 Structural Placement of Business Attributes

Figure 16: Principle in the ArchiMate Motivation Hierarchy

Figure 17: Highlighting the Control Hierarchy Mismatch (i)

Figure 18: Highlighting the Control Hierarchy Mismatch (ii)

Figure 19: Achieving the Desired Hierarchy

5.3.2 Traceability of Business Attributes

Figure 20: Attribute Traceability Across Layers

05.4 Meaning

Figure 21: Applying Attribute Metrics to Multiple controls

Figure 22: Use of Meaning to Externalize Context-Sensitive Metrics

05.5 Impact, Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk

05.6 Controls: Objectives, Requirements, and Measures

Figure 23: Expressing Composite Requirements

Figure 24: Example of a Control Pattern

05.7 Multi-Tiered Security

Figure 25: Example of Multi-Tiered Security

05.8 Regulations and Standards

Figure 26: The Structure of Standards and Regulations

05.9 Articles, Mandates, and Compliance Objectives

Figure 27: Articles and Compliance Objectives

05.10 Control Mechanisms

Figure 28: Use Cases and Iconography for Control

05.11 Trust

06. Modeling Contextual Security Architecture

Figure 29: Developing and Maintaining the Contextual Security Architecture

06.1 Business Assets

6.1.1 Capability and Value Stream

Figure 30: Value Modeling

6.1.2 Business Object

Figure 31: Element Properties and SABSA Attributes

6.1.3 Business Service, Interface, and Service Level Agreements

06.2 Business Risk

06.3 Business Process/Function/Interaction

06.4 Business Roles and Actors

6.4.1 Governance

Figure 32: Representing RACI Relationships

Figure 33: Avoid RACI Entanglement

6.4.2 Threat Actors

Figure 35: Possibilities for Modeling Threat Actors

Figure 36: Sensitivity in the Representation of Threats

06.5 Business Geography

06.6 Business Time Dependencies

07. Modeling Conceptual Security Architecture

Figure 37: Developing the SABSA Conceptual Security Architecture

07.1 Attribute Profiling

Figure 38: Attribute Profiling (i)

Figure 39: Attribute Profiling (ii)

Figure 40: Attribute Profiling (iii)

Figure 41: Completed Attribute Profile

07.2 Risk Management & Strategy

7.2.1 Risk Management

Figure 42: Business Risk Analysis Process

7.2.2 Policy Architecture

Figure 43: Compliance Metamodel

Figure 44: An Example Compliance Model

7.2.3 Multi-Regulatory Compliance

Figure 45: Control Consolidation

Figure 46: Possible Duplicate Objectives, Coupled Through Attribute Profile

07.3 Conceptual Security Services

Figure 47: Security Services in the Conceptual Layer

07.4 Identity and Trust

7.4.1 Identity and Access Rights

Figure 48: What the Security Overlay Would Like to Express

Figure 49: What the ArchiMate Specification Supports

7.4.2 Roles and Responsibilities

Figure 50: Modeling Identity and Role Concepts

7.4.3 Trust

Figure 51: Common Examples of Signals Crossing Domain Boundaries

Figure 52: Simple Trust Relationships using Flow

Figure 53: Trust Attributes Associated with Inter-Domain Signals

07.5 Domain Framework Model

07.6 Security Events

08. Modeling Logical Security Architecture

Figure 54; Developing the SABSA Logical Security Architecture

08.1 Information Assets

8.1.1 Application Components

Figure 55: Critical Applications

8.1.2 Security Configuration

8.1.3 Software Defects and Malware

8.1.4 Data Assets

08.2 Risk Modeling

8.2.1 Risk Modeling

8.2.2 The Scenario

Figure 56: Open FAIR™ Example Scenario

Figure 57: The Open Fair Risk Taxonomy

Figure 58: The Open FAIR Risk Taxonomy Modeled in the ArchiMate Language

Figure 59: Qualitative Example from the Open FAIR Risk Analysis Example Guide

Figure 60: Quantitative Example from the Open FAIR Risk Analysis Example Guide

08.3 Application Functionality and Services

Figure 61: Application Services

08.4 Logical Access Management

Figure 62: Modeling Authentication in the Primary Architecture

Figure 63: Example of Registration and Provisioning in the Secondary Architecture

8.4.1 Account

8.4.2 Application Role

8.4.3 Application Service

8.4.4 Application Process and Function

8.4.5 Application Interface

08.5 Logical Domains

08.6 Timing and Events

8.6.1 Application Security Events

09. Modeling Physical Security Architecture

Figure 64: Developing the SABSA Physical Security Architecture

09.1 Data and Technology Assets

9.1.1 Artifact

9.1.1.1 Executable

9.1.1.2 Data

9.1.1.3 Configuration

Figure 66: Configuration Files

9.1.2 Device and Node

Figure 67: Stereotyping Security Nodes and Devices

09.2 Risk Management Practices

9.2.1 Defect

Figure 68: Risk Management Practices

09.3 Process Mechanisms

Figure 69: Realization of Security Services

9.3.1 Technology Functions and Services

9.3.2 System Software

09.4 Human-Machine Interfaces

9.4.1 Technology Interfaces

09.5 Physical Environment

09.6 Timing and Interrupts

9.6.1 Technology Security Events

10. Conclusion